INTRODUCTION
A goal of a market is to implement a Pareto efficient allocation of resources. Classical general equilibrium theory focuses on the existence of prices that implement an efficient allocation. Solving for such prices requires information about traders' preferences. This information is typically not possessed by any one individual or institution, for each trader typically has some private information about his own preferences. The market must somehow elicit the necessary private information if it is to implement an efficient allocation.
A major obstacle to accomplishing this is the incentive that traders may have to misrepresent their private information. In a market with prices this strategic behaviour takes the form of distorting supply and demand in order to influence price. This behaviour may cause ex post inefficiency, i.e. all potential gains from trade may not be realized. Intuitively, strategic behaviour is only significant in small markets, for the likelihood that a trader can affect price decreases as the number of traders in the market becomes large. In the limiting case of a market with a continuum of traders strategic behaviour vanishes and traders willingly reveal their private information. Appropriate prices can then be calculated and efficiency results. This paper develops the intuition that the number of traders is critical to the performance of a market by using Harsanyi's notion (1967-68) of a Bayesian game to model the impact of private information upon a simple market. We consider an independent, private values model. There are m sellers, each having a single item to sell, and m buyers, each wanting to buy at most one item. Each trader has a reservation value for the item that is independently drawn from the unit interval; a seller's value is drawn from information and individual incentives play within an explicit process of price formation. We do not, however, deal with limitations on rationality and information processing. Nevertheless, our result that all equilibrium strategies of the BBDA in a large market are close to truthful revelation suggests that cognitive limitations are unimportant in large markets.
Our result is reminiscent of a classic result in general equilibrium theory. Building on Debreu and Scarf's (1963) result on the convergence of the core to the Walrasian allocations, Debreu (1975) and Grodal (1975) showed that as a regular Arrow-Debreu economy is replicated, the maximum distance between a core allocation and its nearest Walrasian allocation is 0(1/m), where m is the number of replications.' Beyond the obvious fact that the same rate holds, both results show that in a large market equilibrium outcomes are close to Walrasian outcomes. Some differences, however, between these results should be kept in mind. First, they are based upon very different notions about what happens in a market. The core convergence results assume that the outcome of trade is efficient no matter how many traders are present, while in our model private information and individual incentives cause inefficiency in any finite market. Second, the core convergence results neither explain how a core allocation is achieved nor how prices are formed. Our result concerns an explicit procedure for price formation. If "price-taking behaviour" means accepting prices rather than trying to manipulate them in one's favour, then our result provides insight into this topic, while the core convergence results cannot. It is important to note, however, that the Arrow-Debreu framework is much richer than our elementary model.
A precursor of our result is Roberts and Postlewaite's (1976) study of the noncooperative incentive that an agent within an Arrow-Debreu exchange economy has to act strategically. In their model each agent first reports an excess demand function, a competitive equilibrium is computed based on the reports, and finally goods are allocated according to the computed solution. They show that as a generic economy becomes large each agent's maximal gain from misreporting his excess demand function vanishes. Their result, while related, is different from ours because it does not concern equilibrium behaviour by the agents, it does not model agents' preferences as private information, and it does not state a rate at which misreporting vanishes.
Most directly our work stems from earlier research on Bayesian game models of double auctions. Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) and Leininger et al. (1986) analyzed bilateral double auctions. The mathematical approach of this paper follows naturally from Satterthwaite and Williams's (1987) analysis of the bilateral case. Wilson (1985) showed that double auctions achieve Holmstrom and Myerson's (1983) standard of interim incentive efficiency when the market is sufficiently large. This paper complements Wilson's result by showing that markets also converge at a specified, rapid rate to ex post efficiency as they grow larger.
Our work also stems from the analysis of trading from the mechanism design viewpoint. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) developed techniques for computing the optimal revelation mechanism when reservation values are private on both sides of the market. For given distributions F1 and F2 the optimal mechanism maximizes the ex ante expected gains from trade subject to the constraints of private information and strategic behaviour. Gresik and Satterthwaite (1986, Theorem 5) showed that if the optimal mechanism is used, then the maximal gap between the reservation values of a buyer and a seller who are ex post inefficiently excluded from trade is at most O((ln m)I/2)/m). Dierker (1982) for surveys of this topic.
See Hildenbrand (1982) and
They conjectured that the tighter 0(1/m) rate of our result holds. Our convergence result improves upon theirs in two ways. First, it verifies their conjecture, for the order of the optimal mechanism's bound must be as small as the order of the BBDA's bound. Second, our result concerns a realistic trading procedure. The rules of the BBDA are stated in terms of the offers and bids; the Bayesian game framework is used not to define the BBDA but to analyze the outcome of trade under this procedure when there is private information. By contrast, an optimal mechanism is defined in terms of the distributions F1 and F2; changing the distributions changes the optimal mechanism's rules for allocating the items. As Wilson (1987) 
NOTATION, MODEL, AND PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
Consider a market with m buyers (m ? 2) and m sellers in which each seller wishes to sell an indivisible item and each buyer wishes to purchase at most one item.3 Each seller has a reservation value independently drawn from the distribution F1 and each buyer has a reservation value independently drawn from F2. A trader's reservation value is his own private information. Each distribution Fi is a Cl function whose densityf =Fi is positive at every point in (0, 1) and zero outside [0, 1]. The distributions F1 and F2 are common knowledge among the traders. We use v, to denote a seller's reservation value and v2 to denote a buyer's reservation value. A seller's utility is zero if he fails to sell his item and p -v, if he does sell and the market price is p. Similarly a buyer's utility is zero if he fails to buy and v2-p if he does buy.
These are the common knowledge rules of the BBDA. Every trader simultaneously submits an offer/bid. These offers/bids are arrayed in increasing order s(,) ' S(2) < * * * c S(2m) and the price p is set at S(m+l). Trade occurs among sellers whose offers are strictly less than p and buyers whose bids are greater than or equal to p. When ties occur, p may not be a market-clearing price. In order to explain exactly who trades under the BBDA we refer to Consider the case in which a single offer/bid uniquely determines s(m+l), i.e. j + k = 1 and t + s = m -1. In (2.1) bring s + k to the left-hand side; the left-hand side then sums exactly to m and (2.1) holds with equality. In this case, supply exactly equals demand and every buyer whose bid is at least p purchases an item and every seller whose offer is less than p sells his item. Next consider the remaining case in which at least two offer/bids equal S(m+l), i.e. j + k _ 2 and demand t +j may strictly exceed supply (m -sk). The BBDA then prescribes that the supply of (m -s -k) items is allocated beginning with the buyer who bid the most and working down the list of buyers whose bids are at least p. If in this process a point is reached where two or more buyers submitted identical bids and the remaining supply of unassigned items is insufficient to serve them, then the available supply is rationed among these bidders using a lottery that assigns each an equal chance of receiving an item. This completes the definition of the BBDA.
We adopt the Bayesian game framework to analyse the outcome of trade. Within this framework a trader's reservation value is his type and his strategy is a function that specifies an offer/bid for each of his possible types. An equilibrium consists of a strategy for each trader such that, for each of his possible reservation values, the offer/bid his strategy specifies maximizes his expected utility given the other traders' strategies and the distributions of their reservation values.
We now identify some basic properties of equilibria in the BBDA. The most fundamental property is that a seller can not influence the price p at which he trades by altering his offer. This follows from the BBDA's rule that a seller only sells if his offer is strictly less than the price p s(m+?).
As noted by Wilson (1983) , it follows that sellers have no incentive to act strategically, i.e. each seller's dominant strategy is to submit his reservation We assume throughout this paper that all sellers adopt the strategy S. We also assume that all buyers use the same strategy. Let B denote the common strategy of buyers and let (S, B) denote a set of strategies in which each seller plays S and each buyer piays B. 5. We can not rule out extremely small bids (e.g. b = -1000) for a type-zero buyer and extremely large bids for a type-one buyer. These are probability zero cases that do not affect the expected utilities of other traders and therefore do not affect equilibrium calculations.
By assumption, v'> v2; therefore, P(B(v'); B) _ P(B(v'); B). Since P(*; B) is increasing, we conclude that B(v') ? B(v').
We now show by contradiction that B cannot be constant over any interval with non-empty interior. Suppose that B(v2)= b' for all v2 in such an interval I. The bounds that we have derived upon B imply that 0 < b' < 1. Our argument rests upon the following point: the probability of trade P(b; B) is discontinuous at b -b'. This is true because the following events occur simultaneously with positive probability: (i) each buyer's reservation value is in I and therefore all buyers bid b', (ii) at least one seller's offer is less than b', and (iii) at least one seller's offer is greater than b'. Note that (ii) and (iii) require that m ? 2. Stipulations (i)-(iii) imply that the market price is b', the market fails to clear at this price, and the available units are allocated randomly among the buyers. Raising the selected buyer's bid from b' to b"> b' ensures that he receives an item with probability one in the stipulated situation rather than with some probability less than one under the random allocation rule. Therefore an E > 0 exists such that P(b"; B)> P(b';B)+ E for all b">b'.
We Two points should be emphasized about the monotonicity of the buyers' strategy in an equilibrium (S, B). First, it implies that the probability of ties in the array of offers and bids is zero. Consequently we can ignore ties and the randomized allocations that they may necessitate. Second, the argument in Theorem 2.2 can be applied to double auctions besides the BBDA to show that when m -2 an equilibrium common strategy of either side of the market must be increasing over all intervals in which the probability of trade is positive. Equilibrium strategies in the bilateral case may not be increasing; Leininger, Linhart, and Radnar (1986), for instance, have derived step-function equilibria in the bilateral split-the-difference double auction. Such equilibria, however, do not exist in this double auction when m 2.
THE FIRST-ORDER APPROACH
This section concerns a buyer's first-order condition for maximizing his expected utility conditional on his reservation value v2, the use of a common strategy B by the other m -1 buyers, and the use of S by each seller. If (S, B) is an equilibrium, then this conditional expected utility is maximized at B(v2). We interpret the first-order condition as a differential equation that must be satisfied almost everywhere by any function B that defines an equilibrium (S, B). Conversely, we show that any increasing function B defines an equilibrium (S, B) if (i) B satisfies the differential equation, (ii) B respects the bounds 0< B(v2) < v2 for all v2 E (0, 1], and (iii) the distribution F1 of each seller's reservation value satisfies a monotonicity condition.
The first-order condition is formally derived in the Appendix. Here we state the condition and explain it intuitively. In order to state it we must define three probabilities: Km = the probability that bid b lies between S(m-l) and S(m) in a sample of m -1 buyers using strategy B and m -1 sellers using S.
Lm =the probability that bid b lies between S(m l-2, and S(m) in a sample of m -2 buyers using strategy B and m sellers using S. Mm = the probability that the bid b lies between S(m, and S(m+l) in a sample of m -1 buyers using strategy B and m sellers using S.
Recall that S(k) is the kth-order statistic (i.e. the offer/bid that ranks kth from the bottom) in the specified sample. The buyer has two considerations in raising his bid. First, it may increase his probability of obtaining an item and, second, it may increase by Ab the price he pays for an item that he would have received at price b. These two considerations correspond respectively to the two terms in (3.1), which we now explain in detail. The term in brackets represents the probability that the selected buyer obtains an item by raising his bid. If initially he does not receive an item, then some buyer or seller's offer/bid above b determines the price p. If raising his bid is to benefit the buyer, then p must be in (b, b + Ab), i.e. p must be just above b so that he surpasses it and becomes one of the buyers who purchases an item.
Select a seller in addition to the selected buyer. The probability that this seller's bid falls in the interval (b, b + Ab) is f1(b)Ab. Conditional on it falling in the interval and on the selected buyer bidding b, the probability that this offer determines the market price is Km. Note that this probability is calculated on a sample of the remaining m -1 bids and m -1 offers because the selected buyer's bid and the selected seller's offer are fixed. Any of the m sellers could have been selected, so the probability that by increasing his bid the selected buyer jumps over a price-determining seller's offer is mfi(b)KmAb. A similar argument shows that (m -I)f2(i2)LmlAb/B'(i32) is the probability that the selected buyer jumps over a price-determining buyer's bid as he increases his bid. The density of a buyer's bids at b is f2(i32)/B'(i32), not f2(i32), because the distribution of a buyer's bids is different from the distribution of his reservation values. Finally, the selected buyer's expected gain from obtaining an item by raising his bid is the term in brackets times the gain v2-b -A b when this happens.
On the other side of the ledger is MmvAb. If the buyer is the trader whose bid determines the price, then raising his bid Ab increases the price that he pays for an item by Ab. The expected cost of raising his bid is therefore Ab times the probability Mm that he is in fact the price-determining trader.
From ( Proof. See Appendix. 11
We do not address the existence of equilibria here; Williams (1988) shows that an equilibrium (S, B) exists for a generic choice of the distributions Fl, F2. This rationing creates inefficiency because a buyer whose gain from trade is large is just as likely to be excluded as a buyer whose gain is small. Table 6 .1 illustrates the seriousness of this inefficiency by comparing this mechanism's performance with the BBDA's performance in the uniform case. Informally the reason for the poor performance of the fixed price mechanism is that it only uses traders' reports to determine who is willing to trade at the specified price p. The BBDA, on the other hand, extracts more information from the traders' reports by rank-ordering them according to their expressed desire to trade. Despite the misrepresentation that the BBDA induces, its more thorough use of the agents' reports results in dramatically better performance. points (v2, B(v2) ). The numerator of the right-hand side of (3.6) determines the sign of V2; at (1, B(1)) this numerator is -[1 -B(1)]mf1(B(1))K.,,(1, B(1)) + M,..(1, B(1) formula for N,,,,/ F1 that is given by (A.9) . Next, compute the numerator of (N,, -N 
THE GEOMETRY OF SOLUTIONS Theorem 2.2 states that if (S, B) is an

